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Abstract 
The growth of online marketplaces is accompanied by significant heterogeneity of 
the third-party sellers. The marketplace owner often applies policies that favor the sellers 
who offer higher values to buyers, which puts the lower-value sellers at an even greater 
disadvantage. This leads to the phenomenon of Matthew Effect. Our study focuses on a 
marketplace owner’s policy in managing seller heterogeneity and analyzes Matthew 
Effect in a competitive market environment. By extending the circular city model, we 
analytically examine the price competition among a large number of sellers that differ 
both in variety and in their value offerings. We present the closed-form equilibrium 
solution for the sellers’ pricing strategies, which illustrates the ripple effect that exerts 
competitive pressure from seller to seller at a diminishing magnitude. Furthermore, we 
show that, by providing each seller with the support that enhances its value offering 
proportionally, the marketplace owner further sharpens seller heterogeneity and creates 
Matthew Effect. This results in an increased profit for the marketplace owner and 
improved consumer surplus. The optimal level of such value-based support is dependent 
on the distribution of the sellers’ values and the buyers’ horizontal preferences. Our 
findings suggest that Matthew Effect improves social welfare by increasing the total 
profits of sellers and the marketplace owner, as well as the consumer surplus; moreover, 
it creates business opportunities for new sellers in the online marketplace.  
Keywords: Seller heterogeneity, variety, Matthew Effect, circular city model. 
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“For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him 
that hath not shall be taken even that which he hath.” 
-- Matthew 25:29, The King James Bible. 
1. Introduction 
Along with the exciting business opportunities that come with online 
marketplaces, the many sellers that emerge bring forth a high degree of heterogeneity. As 
Amazon welcomes on board more third-party sellers, product condition and shipping 
service further depend on the variability in the individual sellers’ business knowledge and 
practice. Similarly, on Taobao, the C2C market of the Alibaba Group, some sellers are 
committed to building a reputable online business, while others may be simply selling for 
a hobby. Airbnb is a marketplace that enables sharing of unused living space between 
hosts and travelers; hosts’ hospitality can also vary significantly. A traveler might 
encounter a longer delay in the response from an ad-hoc host who only participates 
occasionally, compared to that from a host who is routinely seeking renters for longer 
stays. Also, in mobile application markets, as the markets are open to both professional 
and amateur developers, not all third-party developers can create games that are 
addictively entertaining. In general, sellers are highly heterogeneous in the value they 
offer to buyers. Such value offering is analogous to the combination of sellers’ product 
quality and service performance and is characterized by a set of specific attributes that are 
relevant to the marketplace.  
The heterogeneity of sellers’ value offerings (or “value” for short) plays a pivotal 
role in determining buyers’ purchasing choices, sellers’ price competition, and ultimately 
the marketplace owner’s profit. It is well established theoretically and apparent in 
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practice that the degree of sellers’ value heterogeneity directly determines the buyers’ 
purchasing decisions. Meanwhile, each seller strategically considers other sellers’ 
characteristics relative to those of its own while setting price. In many marketplaces, the 
sellers with higher value offerings tend to capture a larger market than newer and weaker 
sellers, who are pressured to set lower prices. Thus, sellers’ heterogeneous characteristics 
are important to strategic interactions among sellers and buyers in the marketplace and to 
the sellers’ profits, part of which is then absorbed by the marketplace owner.  
Aside from value heterogeneity, the sellers’ variety further complicates the 
economic mechanisms in the marketplace. Variety refers to the number of horizontally 
differentiated sellers, who carry products of different attributes—such as color, style, 
functionality, and location—to target buyers of different tastes. For example, on a typical 
day, the eBay market displays more than 2 million postings for women's shoes alone, 
which can be sorted into different styles, brands, heel heights, sizes, and so on. Similarly, 
Airbnb listings show apartments located near downtown, country homes in tranquil 
neighborhoods, studios next to hiking trails, and other locations that suit renters' different 
needs. More variety could lead to an increasingly crowded marketplace with highly 
similar products. As a result, the substitution effect intensifies competition between 
sellers, which may lead to a more aggressive pricing strategy. On the other hand, with the 
increased similarity between sellers’ products, their value offerings based on attributes 
such as service quality may become a more prominent factor in buyers’ purchasing 
choices. Therefore, heterogeneity in sellers’ values offerings and seller variety interact 
and jointly determine the sellers’ and buyers’ surplus.  
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Interestingly, marketplace owners manage seller heterogeneity by rewarding 
sellers based on their values offerings. Both Taobao and T-Mall, two of Alibaba Group’s 
marketplaces, selectively offers promotional opportunities to higher-value sellers who 
can then further enhance their appeals to buyers. Airbnb dynamically ranks listings based 
on hosts’ reviews, nights booked, response rate, and cancellations. In effect, the hosts that 
offer lower values to travelers get less exposure, which create competitive pressure on 
their pricing and profits. Moreover, T-Mall applies higher fees on lower-value sellers 
(Fletcher 2011), which puts these sellers at an even greater disadvantage relative to 
higher-value competitors. App markets, such as Apple’s App Store and Google Play, 
promote applications that win the developer contests and attain high scores for the Top-
Charts criteria.1 Similarly, Facebook implemented a rule change in 2008 that allowed 
more engaging apps to further engage more users by allocating to them a higher number 
of notifications relative to the less engage apps (Claussen et al. 2013). A common 
characteristic among these value-based treatments is that they favor high-value sellers 
and, in turn, sharpen heterogeneity of sellers, which alters seller competition and may 
lead to profound economic implications for the sellers, the buyers, and the marketplace 
owner.  
These value-based treatments enhance heterogeneity of the sellers and, thus, 
create Matthew Effect. Matthew Effect is a concept that originates from the Gospel of 
Matthew and describes the phenomenon of the “rich” receiving an additional advantage 
over those who are struggling and, in turn, getting “richer”; in other words, it is the effect 
of an unequal treatment that favors those who already have a superior status. Matthew 
                                                     
1 Based on the industry observations and analysis, the ranking of App Store Top Charts is continuously 
adjusted and have factored in app rating, engagement and many other criteria aside from the number of 
downloads (Perez 2013). 
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Effect has been applied to sociological, economic, and other scientific contexts. It was 
first adopted by Merton (1968) to describe the misallocation of credit in the rewards 
systems for scientific work. It is interesting to explore whether, in online marketplaces, 
Matthew Effect that results from the value-based treatments also leads to “misallocation” 
of revenues and welfare among the users. These treatments shift the revenues between 
sellers of different values through the economic mechanism of trades; meanwhile, part of 
the total revenues is absorbed by the marketplace owner. It is unclear to which extent the 
marketplace owner might gain from creating Matthew Effect. It is also important to 
examine who gain and lose in this phenomenon in the presence of competitive forces. In 
this paper, we address this issue and, more specifically, the following questions:  
(1) How does value heterogeneity among a variety of sellers affect their 
competition, pricing strategies, and profits?  
(2) How does the Matthew Effect created through the marketplace owner’s value-
based treatment impact seller competition, the profits in the marketplace, and consumer 
surplus?  
(3) What is the optimal level of the marketplace owner’s value-based treatment 
for managing seller heterogeneity? How does this optimal level depend on sellers’ and 
buyers’ characteristics? 
(3) How does the marketplace owner’s value-based treatment affect the optimal 
seller variety in the marketplace?  
We extend the circular city model (Salop 1979) to allow differentiated seller 
values among a large number of sellers who also differ horizontally. The closed-form 
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solution for the equilibrium prices and profits of these sellers is obtained. We then derive 
the marketplace owner's profits based on the sellers’ equilibrium profits and analyze a 
policy that offers each seller support by increasing its value offering proportionally. This 
value-based support leads to Matthew Effect, as higher-value sellers receive higher 
support than lower-value sellers, and value heterogeneity is sharpened. We then solve for 
the marketplace owner’s optimal support level and examine its properties. Finally, we 
discuss the implication of Matthew Effect for the marketplace owner’s profit, the sellers’ 
profits, the consumer surplus, and the number of sellers in the market.  
The equilibrium of seller competition shows a ripple effect that analytically 
captures the competition dynamics among a variety of heterogeneous sellers: Changes to 
any seller's price propagate to its immediate neighbors, then to their neighbors, and so on 
at a rapidly decreasing magnitude. This suggests that strategizing with only the first- and 
second-degree neighbors is of primary importance. Furthermore, the average equilibrium 
price does not depend on sellers' value because the ripple effect distributes value effects 
across all sellers' prices, keeping the sum of the prices constant.  
Based on a percentage royalty revenue model, the equilibrium analysis then leads 
to the study of the marketplace owner’s value-based support policy and Matthew Effect. 
We show that the marketplace owner’s expected profit is independent of the average of 
sellers’ values, which implies that a uniform treatment to all sellers is ineffective. The 
change to each seller's value is offset by competition between the neighboring sellers – 
the degree of value heterogeneity remains unchanged. The value-based support, which 
leads to Matthew Effect, indeed results in a higher total profit among sellers and, 
therefore, a higher profit for the marketplace owner. The increase in value variation shifts 
7 
 
more competitive advantage to the higher-value sellers, resulting in a more imbalanced 
competition. The gains of these sellers outweigh the loss of lower-value sellers; thus, the 
total profit increases. 
Moreover, we find that the marketplace owner needs to calibrate the optimal level 
of the value-based support based on both sellers’ and buyers’ characteristics. A higher 
average of sellers’ values makes the support more costly without affecting the 
marketplace owner's profits; thus, a higher average value reduces the optimal support 
level. Conversely, a higher value variance means that value heterogeneity is more 
responsive to the support, and the optimal support level is higher. Buyers' transportation 
cost reflects the degree of horizontal differentiation among sellers. A higher 
transportation cost mitigates neighboring sellers' competition, which in turn reduces the 
effectiveness of the support and lowers the optimal support level. 
We also examine the impact of Matthew Effect on the buyers’ surplus and the 
optimal seller variety. We find that the value-based support leads to a higher expected 
consumer surplus. While buyers consume higher values offered by the sellers under the 
support, the increase in price is suppressed by the sellers’ competition. As a result, the 
buyers are overall better off under Matthew Effect. Moreover, we show that the seller 
variety that maximizes the marketplace owner’s profit increases, when the marketplace 
owner offers the value-based support. In the absence of value heterogeneity, an increase 
in seller variety intensifies competition and reduces the marketplace owner's profits; 
however, with heterogeneous values, the Matthew Effect created by the value-based 
support enhances value heterogeneity and make the positive effect of variety more 
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pronounced. Therefore, the marketplace owner benefits from bringing more sellers into 
the market, which generates new opportunities for online selling.  
The equilibrium characterization of users’ transactions in our work offers an 
important contribution to the literature of spatial competition with heterogeneity. A few 
recent studies also incorporate heterogeneity in the circular city model (Alderighi and 
Piga 2012, Syverson 2004, Vogel 2008). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
derive the closed-form equilibrium solution in the circular city setting with seller 
heterogeneity and price propagation between sellers. The availability of explicit solution 
forms removes the reliance on numerical approximation—such as that in Alderighi and 
Piga (2012)—and permits further analytical studies. Specifically, the equilibrium solution 
indicates the degrees of the ripple effect between sellers of different values at different 
locations, which is fundamental to understanding competition among a large number of 
heterogeneous sellers. This takes a significant step forward from the traditional 
frameworks that are often limited to only two sellers and leads to a rigorous analysis of 
management strategies for a vibrant marketplace.  
The findings in this paper lead to a number of managerial insights. First, in a large 
marketplace, sellers can primarily compete directly and indirectly against the few that 
offer the most similar products. The interactions with the remaining competitors have 
insignificant impact on the profits. Second, a marketplace policy that shifts the overall 
seller value is ineffective in a saturated market; on the other hand, the value-based policy 
that many marketplace owners implement indeed results in higher profits for the higher-
value sellers as well as for the marketplace owner. Third, the marketplace owner should 
also adjust the level of its policy according to the changes in the average of sellers’ value 
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and the degrees of their value heterogeneity and horizontal differentiation. Fourth, the 
Matthew Effect created from the value-based support policy not only benefits the higher-
value sellers and the marketplace owner, but also makes the buyers better off and creates 
new online selling opportunities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related 
literature and highlight the contribution of our work. Section 3 presents the model setup. 
In Section 4, we characterize and analyze the equilibrium of competing sellers in the 
marketplace. Based on these results, in Section 5, we examine the marketplace owner's 
value-based support and discuss the Matthew Effect that emerges in such a policy. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature 
Our study is related to the literature on horizontal differentiation and localized 
competition (Hotelling 1929, Salop 1979). Among the many applications of the circular 
city model (Alderighi and Piga 2012, Syverson 2004, Vogel 2008), Alderighi and Piga 
(2012) is most directly related to our work. Unlike Syverson (2004) and Vogel (2008), 
both which do not consider price propagation between sellers, Alderighi and Piga (2012) 
capture the ripple effect of the sellers’ pricing decisions that propagate around the circle 
highlighted in our model. Based on numerical solution of equilibrium prices, Alderighi 
and Piga (2012) generalize the properties of the coefficients and derive implications for 
geographic concentration of downstream retailers in relation to their upstream 
wholesalers. Our work makes two major contributions: First, the heterogeneity that we 
introduce to the circular city model lies in firms' value offerings, which affects both 
sellers’ strategies and buyers’ valuations, whereas firms' heterogeneity in efficiency 
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studied by Alderighi and Piga (2012) is not directly relevant to buyers’ decisions. Thus, 
value heterogeneity in our work introduces new complexity that is not accounted for 
previously. More importantly, we obtain the closed-form, analytical solution of the 
equilibrium prices, market shares and profits, which enables us to further analyze 
dependencies of the equilibrium on quality heterogeneity. 
Economides (1993) also accounts for firms’ quality in a circular city model. He 
compares two setups in which firms make entry (location), quality, and pricing decisions. 
He derives symmetric equilibrium among the firms in each scenario and finds that their 
precommitment on quality leads to a greater variety but lower quality. Even though 
quality variation is considered in Economides (1993), quality heterogeneity is not present 
in equilibrium. Our study tackles the problem of characterizing the equilibrium among 
horizontally differentiated sellers who also have heterogeneous quality levels. The 
equilibrium characterization also provides the foundation for analyzing other dimensions 
of heterogeneity among a large number of sellers. 
Competition among a large number of sellers generates on-going research 
interests in various electronic markets. Motivated by security software’s unique market 
structure of many vendors with low market shares, Dey et al. (2012) study the underlying 
economic forces exerted by the negative network effect associated with indirect attacks. 
By modeling the competition between many security software vendors, they provide a 
theoretical explanation for the high equilibrium prices and low market coverage. Xu et al. 
(2011) analyze oligopolistic price competition between multiple firms in the online 
search environment, where the firms have different ranks in consumers’ search ordering. 
They find that, in equilibrium, the firms have asymmetric mixed-strategy for setting 
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prices for both exogenous and endogenous consumer search strategies. Chen and Stallaert 
(2014) study behavioral targeting in online advertising and allow advertisers to target 
different users. They show how the heterogeneity in both advertisers’ values and users’ 
preferences affects the publisher’s and advertisers’ benefits from behavioral targeting. 
Our work also explores heterogeneity among a multitude of sellers and their competitive 
pricing strategies, in the context of online marketplaces. Our findings contribute to this 
stream of knowledge by capturing both value heterogeneity and seller variety and by 
evaluating the marketplace owner’s policy in managing seller heterogeneity.  
Our study is also related to two-sided platforms, as marketplaces act as platforms 
that serve sellers and buyers. Our work is concerned with the management of platform 
users and their transactions within the platform, whereas the platform literature has 
focused primarily on user entry into the platform, which then links to the network effects 
and two-sided fees (Rochet and Tirole 2003, Parker and Van Alstyne 2005, Armstrong 
2006). The recent research efforts in this literature are actually moving toward the 
heterogeneity of users. Boudreau (2011) points out that, in software development, 
generating variety depends on “the heterogeneity and diversity of producers, rather than 
just the added numbers of producers per se” (p. 1). He empirically shows that the effect 
of introducing additional software producers on innovation depends on the heterogeneity 
of their software programs. Also, Ceccagnoli et al. (2012) find that differences in 
independent software vendors' (ISVs') capabilities create heterogeneity in their 
performance improvements.  
Several other papers in the platforms literature also consider seller heterogeneity 
by modeling the transactions between the sellers and buyers. Hagiu (2009) and Lin et al. 
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(2011) examine buyer preferences and seller competition in the pricing decisions of a 
two-sided platform. Whereas in Hagiu (2009) many homogeneous sellers compete on a 
platform, Lin et al. (2011) model two sellers of differentiated quality. Thus, the former 
provides a richer discussion regarding seller variety, and the latter on sellers’ quality 
levels. Different from these two studies, our work allows many sellers that differ in terms 
of both variety and value offerings to compete on a platform. A challenge in this setting 
may reside in analyzing the price competition between more than two sellers with 
different attributes. Our equilibrium characterization overcomes this obstacle and 
provides a theoretical foundation for the related questions.    
3. Model Setup 
In a marketplace, transactions take place between multiple sellers with 
heterogeneous value offerings and buyers with heterogeneous tastes. Following Salop 
(1979), a continuum of buyers is distributed uniformly on a circle of unit circumference. 
Their locations represent their tastes. Denote by ݊ the number of sellers in the 
marketplace. ݊ represents the degree of seller variety, as variety is generally proportional 
to the number of sellers (Boudreau 2011).  
Whereas in Salop (1979) the variety of sellers have a uniform value, our model 
allows these sellers to be heterogeneous in their value offerings to the buyers. Sellers’ 
values include the set of specifically attributes that are relevant to the marketplace (as 
defined in Section 1). For example, in the case of Taobao.com, a seller’s value may be an 
aggregate measure of its product condition, promptness in responding to potential buyers’ 
enquiries, delivery service, product guarantee, experience as a Taobao seller, and any 
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other additional offerings to buyers. Denote seller ݅’s value by ݒ௜. Let the sellers’ values 
follow a distribution with the cumulative distribution function ܨሺݒሻ. 
Following the common assumption in the applications of the circular city model, 
sellers are located equidistantly on the circle (Chen and Stallaert 2014). Without the loss 
of generality, let seller ݅ be located at ௜௡ and offer value ݒ௜ ൐ 0 at price ݌௜, where ݅ ∈
ሼ0,1, … , ݊ െ 1ሽ. Note that seller ݊ െ 1 is adjacent to seller 0 on the circle.  Each buyer 
purchases from one seller and incurs a transportation cost due to the difference between 
this seller and that of an ideal match. The transportation cost is linear in the distance 
between the seller and the buyer at the rate ݐ. Thus, buyer ݔ's utility from purchasing 
seller ݅ is ݒ௜ െ ݌௜ െ ݐ ∙ ቚ ௜௡ െ ݔቚ.  
The marketplace owner offers support to sellers based on their values. For 
instance, Taobao often offers promotional opportunities to sellers with higher value 
offerings in terms of relevant attributes discussed previously. These sellers are then able 
to reach more buyers, gain additional selling tactics, and further improve their values. 
Similarly, on Airbnb, the hosts are presented to renters based on their responses to 
potential renters, cleanliness, hospitality, cancelation rate, and any other characteristics of 
the property areas. Airbnb’s ranking based on the combined metric of hosts’ values 
provides higher-value hosts with better opportunities to showcase their properties and 
other value attributes. In short, higher-value sellers gain more from the value-based 
support compared to the lower-value sellers – this phenomenon exhibits Matthew Effect. 
Mathematically, let the marketplace owner’s decision be the proportional level of support, 
ߙ, based on each seller's original value. Thus, under this policy, seller ݅ effectively offers 
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an additional value of ߙݒ௜. The marketplace owner incurs a variable cost from the support: 
ܿሺߙݒ௜ሻଶ; it is commonly assumed that achieving a higher value is increasingly costly.  
The marketplace owner collects a percentage royalty, ߛ, from each seller’s profit 
and chooses the level of support based on the total royalty collected under the support 
less the cost. We let the marketplace owner’s decision be based on the distribution of 
sellers’ values, as it is often more feasible to utilize the aggregate characteristics of the 
users in a large marketplace. The timing of the game is the following: The marketplace 
owner sets the level of the support; the support then takes effect on each seller’s value; 
with complete information, the sellers set prices simultaneously while the buyers make 
purchasing decisions; finally, both the sellers’ and the marketplace owner’s profits are 
realized.  
4. Competing Sellers and Equilibrium 
By backward induction, we first analyze the buyers' purchasing decisions and the 
sellers' equilibrium prices and profits in the marketplace. Based on these equilibrium 
results, we examine the marketplace owner’s policy problem in Section 5.  
Along the circumference of the circle, each seller's price and quality directly 
affect its neighboring sellers' decisions; the same effect is then carried to these 
neighboring sellers' neighboring sellers.  The effect propagates around the circle, 
generating a ripple effect.  To mathematically model this continuous competitive effect 
around the circle, we extend the range of ݅, such that ݅ ∈ Ժ, where seller ݅ and seller ݅ േ ݊ 
are the same entity. For example, seller 0 and seller ݊ refer to the same seller, so do 
sellers 1, ݊ ൅ 1, and 2݊ ൅ 1, and so on. 
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Following the convention in the literature of spatial competition (Eaton and 
Lipsey 1978, Syverson 2004, Alderighi and Piga 2012), we examine the equilibrium in 
which all sellers are locally competitive in the market; in other words, no seller’s value is 
too low to attract any buyer. Condition 1 is sufficient for ruling out such cases: 
Condition 1. For any  ݅ ∈ Ժ, .|ݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ାଵ| ൏ ௧௡.  
The buyer located at ݔ between sellers ݅ and ݅ ൅ 1 is indifferent between the two 
sellers if  
ݒ௜ െ ݌௜ െ ݐ ൬ݔ െ ݅݊൰ ൌ ݒ௜ାଵ െ ݌௜ାଵ െ ݐ ൬
݅ ൅ 1
݊ െ ݔ൰. 
From here, we identify the marginal buyer between sellers ݅ and ݅ ൅ 1:  
ݔ ൌ 12ݐ ሺݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ାଵ െ ݌௜ ൅ ݌௜ାଵሻ ൅
݅
݊ ൅
1
2݊. 
Thus, seller ݅'s demand is expressed as,  
 ݍ௜ ൌ 12ݐ ሺ2ݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ାଵ െ ݒ௜ିଵ െ 2݌௜ ൅ ݌௜ାଵ ൅ ݌௜ିଵሻ ൅
1
݊. 
(1)
Its profit is ߨ௜ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ݌௜ݍ௜, which is concave in ݌௜. The ݊ sellers' optimal prices are 
given by the following ݊ first order conditions (FOCs):  
 ݌௜ ൌ ݐ2݊ ൅
1
4 ሺ2ݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ାଵ െ ݒ௜ିଵ ൅ ݌௜ାଵ ൅ ݌௜ିଵሻ, ∀݅ ∈ ሼ0, 1, 2, … , ݊ െ 1ሽ. 
(2)
Proposition 1 (Marketplace Equilibrium). There exists a unique Nash equilibrium, in 
which seller ࢏'s price is 
 
݌௜∗ ൌ ݐ݊ ൅ ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
, ∀݅ ∈ ሼ0,1, … ݊ െ 1ሽ, 
(3)
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where ܾௗ ൌ ఋ
೙ష೏ାఋ೏
√ଷሺఋ೙ିଵሻ	 ൐ 0, ߜ ൌ 2 ൅ √3. Its equilibrium demand is ݍ௜∗ ൌ
ଵ
௡ ൅
௩೔
௧ െ
ଵ
௧ ∑ ܾௗݒ௜ିௗ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ , and its equilibrium profit is  
 ߨ௜ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ݌௜
∗ଶ
ݐ . 
(4)
Each seller's equilibrium price, demand, and profit are increasing in its own value and 
decreasing in the value of the other sellers. 
Proposition 1 characterizes the closed-form equilibrium solution of the circular 
city model with heterogeneous values. To the best of our knowledge, no prior studies 
provide such an equilibrium characterization. Among closely related works, most models 
abstract out seller heterogeneity when studying the sellers' pricing decisions (Syverson 
2004; Vogel 2008); one exception is Alderighi and Piga (2012), which shows the 
uniqueness of equilibrium when multiple firms with heterogeneous production costs 
compete in a circular city setting; however, they do not characterize the equilibrium and, 
instead, use numerical approximations to analyze the properties of the equilibrium. The 
significance of the closed-form solution in our work goes beyond mathematical elegance. 
As analytically shown below, it empowers us to rigorously illustrate the impact of value 
heterogeneity on sellers' equilibrium strategies and profits, and on the marketplace 
owner’s policy decisions. 
Proposition 1 offers several insights. First, intuitively, each seller's equilibrium 
price, demand, and profit are increasing in its own value. When a seller improves its 
value, ceteris paribus, it attracts additional buyers located further away in terms of taste. 
The value superiority compensates for a certain degree of mismatch, enabling the seller to 
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raise its price and gain a higher profit. Equivalently, when a seller’s value is reduced, it is 
not only pressured to cut price, its market share also shrinks as some buyers switch to the 
neighboring sellers. Given that both the market share and price of a seller are 
proportional to its own value (Proposition 1), the value has a quadratic effect on sellers’ 
equilibrium profits.  
Second, any seller's equilibrium price, demand, and profit are not only negatively 
affected by its neighboring competitors’ values, but also by those of more remote sellers. 
The ripple effect is the force that connects all sellers: When a seller increases its value 
offering, the direct competition between that seller and its neighbors induces the 
neighboring sellers to cut price; then these sellers’ neighboring sellers are also pressured 
to cut prices. This price cutting strategy propagates around the circle riding on the ripple 
effect and hits every seller.  
The magnitude of the value effect depends on sellers’ relative locations. In 
particular, a seller experience a more pronounced negative impact from the value 
improvement of another seller that offers a more similar product (i.e., located more 
nearby). Eq. (3) shows that ܾௗ ൏ ܾௗᇲif minሼ݀, ݊ െ ݀ሽ ൏ minሼ݀ᇱ, ݊ െ ݀ᇱሽ, which implies 
that the impact of value diminishes from seller to seller. Moreover, notice that the indirect, 
negative impact of a seller’ value to the remote sellers diminishes quickly as it passes 
through sellers. The impacts of a seller’s value to the prices of its immediate neighbors, 
second-degree (neighbor’s) neighbors, and third-degree (neighbors’ neighbors’) 
neighbors converge to ଵ√ଷ൫ଶା√ଷ൯, 
ଵ
√ଷ൫ଶା√ଷ൯మ, and 
ଵ
√ଷ൫ଶା√ଷ൯య, respectively (i.e., 0.155, 0.041, 
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and 0.011, respectively), as ݊ increases.2 Therefore, in a marketplace with many sellers, it 
is adequate for each seller to strategize against its first- and second-degree competitors.   
The ripple effect illustrates the competitive forces that are absent from both the 
circular city model without value heterogeneity and a duopoly competition. Our 
equilibrium characterization explicitly identifies the strengths of cross-seller value effect 
with the coefficient ܾௗ for different sellers. In contrast, without value heterogeneity, the 
circular city model does not allow any seller to hold an advantage over its competitors. 
Seller heterogeneity is often of interest, if not elemental, in marketplaces. Duopoly 
models allow richer analysis of seller differentiation; however, the seller base of size two 
also considerably restricts in-depth discussions of marketplaces where a large number of 
diverse sellers are present. Our work makes a contribution by examining the effects of 
seller heterogeneity on the competition where a high number of sellers make strategic 
decisions. 
Proposition 2 (Average Price and Quality). The average equilibrium price of sellers, ࢖ഥ ൌ
࢚
࢔, is independent of the value offering. 
Although the value offering affects individual sellers' pricing strategies, it exerts 
no impact on the average price among sellers. Sellers' price adjustments that respond to 
changes in the value offering follow a zero-sum game. As shown in Proposition 1, an 
increase in one seller's value raises its own price and reduces the price of all other sellers. 
The ripple effect distributes the shift in one seller's price to remaining sellers and keeps 
the average price constant. Expectedly, the average price decreases in the number of 
                                                     
2 In fact, the convergence is sufficient fast such that, even at ݊ ൌ 10, the impact on the third-degree 
neighbor is miniscule. 
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sellers on the platform. With more sellers in the marketplace, their products are more 
similar; the intensified competition then leads to an overall price cut. 
5. Marketplace Owner’s Problem 
In this section, we examine the marketplace owner's problem of setting the 
optimal level of the value-based support that generates Matthew Effect among the sellers. 
In particular, the marketplace owner maximizes the total royalty collected from the 
transactions with consideration for the costs incurred from the support. First, by 
substituting in sellers' equilibrium profits from Proposition 1, we derive the marketplace 
owner’s expected profit based on the distribution of the sellers’ values. 
Lemma 1 The marketplace owner’s expected profit is: 
 ܧሺΠ∗ሻ ൌ ߛݐ݊ ൅
ߛ݊
ݐ ∙ ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൬1 െ
4
3√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰. (5) 
 
 
Notice that the marketplace owner’s profit is independent of the expected value of 
sellers’ value offerings. This suggests that a policy that benefits all sellers equally 
generates no additional surplus, positive or negative, to sellers or to the marketplace 
owner. As discussed in Lemma 1, any shifts in the expected value dissipate in seller 
competition, and only the relative—not absolute—values of neighboring sellers 
determine their profits. The marketplace owner’s royalty, which is a fraction of sellers' 
total profits, is then also independent of any uniform change to all sellers’ values. 
As the marketplace owner offers the value-based support that enhances the sellers’ 
values proportionally, the expected profit under the support is:  
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ܧ൫Π௣∗൯ ൌ ߛݐ݊ ൅
ߛ݊
ݐ ∙ ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ
ଶܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൬1 െ 43√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰
െ ܧ ൭෍ܿሺߙݒ௜ሻଶ
௡ିଵ
௜ୀ଴
൱
ൌ ߛݐ݊ ൅
ߛ݊
ݐ ∙ ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻ
ଶܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൬1 െ 43√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰
െ ݊ܿߙଶ൫ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൅ ܧଶሺݒሻ൯. (6) 
 
 
Therefore, the increase in the marketplace owner’s expected profit is:  
 ܧ൫Π௣∗൯ െ ܧሺΠ∗ሻ
ൌ ߛ݊ݐ ܸܽݎሺݒሻሺߙ
ଶ െ 2ߙሻ ൬1 െ 43√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰
െ ݊ܿߙଶ൫ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൅ ܧଶሺݒሻ൯. (7) 
 
 
Proposition 3 (Optimal Support Level) Offering a common support to all sellers equally 
does not impact the marketplace owner’s expected profit. But, the marketplace is better 
off providing value-based support to its sellers. The optimal level is: 
 ߙ∗ ൌ 1ܿݐ
ߛ ൬1 െ
4
3√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰ ൬1 ൅
ܧሺݒሻଶ
ܸܽݎሺݒሻ൰ െ 1
. (8) 
 
 
 
The value-based support to sellers increases the marketplace owner's profit by 
enhancing value heterogeneity among the sellers. Recall that Proposition 1 shows an 
increase in a seller’s value leads to higher price and demand for this seller. The value-
based support allows the higher-value sellers to lift price and attract more buyers; 
meanwhile, as the lower-value sellers become more disadvantaged, they are pressured to 
cut price while losing market shares. In other words, by rewarding higher-value sellers 
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with an advantage, the competition among sellers becomes more imbalanced. The gains 
of the high-value sellers outweigh the loss of the low-value sellers, as the former fulfill 
more transactions than the latter. Therefore, the total profits among sellers, hence the total 
royalty that the marketplace owner collects is higher.  
Indeed, the Matthew Effect generated by the value-based support is beneficial for 
the marketplace owner and the higher-value sellers. The equilibrium analysis of the 
sellers’ pricing strategies and the buyers’ purchasing choices rigorously illustrates the 
economic mechanism behind the Matthew Effect. By creating advantages for higher-
value sellers, the marketplace owner is able to reduce the less profitable transactions, 
increase the number of more profitable ones, and further raise the profits of the latter. 
This practice is nevertheless controversial, especially when the disparity in the treatment 
to sellers is too extreme and a large number of lower-value sellers are unable to handle 
the competitive pressure (He 2011). Thus, we further discuss the optimal level of the 
value-based support in terms of characteristics of the sellers and buyers.  
Proposition 4 For a higher average of sellers’ value offerings, the marketplace owner’s 
optimal support level is lower; however, for a higher variance of sellers' value offering, 
the marketplace owner’s optimal support level is higher. 
Both the average and the variance of sellers’ values impact the extent of the 
marketplace owner’s support. A higher average value offering reduces the optimal 
support level because it makes the support more costly at the same level without affecting 
the total profits. The optimal level is, therefore, adjusted downward to offset the cost 
increase. On the other hand, value heterogeneity incentivizes a higher support level. The 
reason is that more heterogeneous value offerings are more sensitive to the value-based 
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support. The marketplace owner can then sharpen value heterogeneity more cost-
effectively. 
Proposition 4 points out that, because the support is not costless, the marketplace 
owner should calibrate the extent of this effort based on the characteristics of its sellers. 
The expected seller value offering and value heterogeneity play starkly different roles on 
the marketplace owner's decisions. A marketplace with more lower-value sellers or a 
wider range of seller value can offer more generous support. As sellers change over time, 
it is necessary that the marketplace owner re-evaluates its support offering. 
Proposition 5 For a higher buyer transportation cost, the marketplace owner’s optimal 
support level is lower. 
When sellers are more differentiated in terms of variety, the marketplace owner 
offers a lower support level. Eq. (7) indicates that the transportation cost, ݐ, dampens the 
marketplace owner's gains from the support to sellers. The reason is that, if the sellers are 
more differentiated in terms of variety, any changes to their value offerings will have a 
lower impact on the neighboring sellers. In other words, the marketplace owner’s support 
becomes less effective. Therefore, the optimal level is lower with more differentiation in 
seller variety. This seems to suggest that differentiations in terms of variety and value 
heterogeneity are complementary in their effects on the marketplace owner's profits.  
In addition to a value-based support discussed above, it is interesting to note that 
the marketplace can also achieve profit gains by undermining lower-value sellers. Given 
that the marketplace owner yields higher profits with more value variation among sellers, 
enhancing such heterogeneity at the lower end has the same effect. If lower-value sellers 
have further reduced value offerings, the competition also becomes more imbalanced, 
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which allows higher-value sellers to reap more profits and results in higher profits for the 
marketplace owner. This finding coincides with T-Mall’s policy that imposes a heavier 
burden on lower-value sellers through increased security deposits (Fletcher 2011). This 
strategy is intriguing because the lower-value sellers' service is impaired due to the 
tightened financial constraint, and the impairment due the policy revision makes them 
even less capable than the higher-value sellers in obtaining the deposit refund.  
Other Implications of Value-Based Support 
 We have established thus far that the Matthew Effect created through the value-
based support leads to an increase in the total profits in the marketplace and, therefore, 
benefits the marketplace owner. However, as the increases in sellers’ values are 
accompanied by higher prices, it is not obvious how the value-based support impacts the 
welfare of the buyers. We study the buyers’ tradeoffs between receiving higher value 
offerings from the sellers and paying higher prices and derive the following result.   
Proposition 6 (Consumer Surplus) The value-based support leads to a higher expected 
consumer surplus. 
Under the value-based support, some buyers purchase from the same seller they 
would choose absent the support, while other buyers choose a different seller as a result 
of the shifts in sellers’ values. For the first group of buyers, the additional benefit from 
the sellers’ value increase is greater than the increase in price. Even though the higher-
value sellers are able to raise their prices, the competition from the other sellers keeps the 
extent of price lift below the extent of value increase. Therefore, the value-based support 
raises the surplus of the first group of buyers. Meanwhile, the second group of buyers 
“switch” to the higher-value sellers under the value-based support. (In other words, they 
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would choose a lower-value seller absent the value-based support.) Their surplus is also 
improved because, by “switching”, they are effectively making a choice that yields a 
higher surplus than transacting with the seller of choice absent the support. Thus, all the 
buyers obtain a higher surplus under the value-based support.    
By creating the Matthew Effect, the marketplace owner not only generate more 
profit overall, it also raises the buyers’ payoffs; thus, the Matthew Effect improves the 
social welfare. Aside from the lower-value sellers who are disadvantaged, Matthew 
Effect brings benefit to all the other players in the marketplace. Clearly, the phenomenon 
of Matthew Effect in the online marketplaces is economically desirable, not only from the 
marketplace owner’s perspective. However, it may still be worthwhile to further evaluate 
this biased treatment against the weaker sellers.  
The value-based support policy for the management of seller value heterogeneity 
has additional implications for the seller variety. The marketplace owner’s profit function 
identifies an optimal seller variety. By examining Eq. (5), we can see that as the number 
of seller increases, leading to greater variety, the impact on the marketplace owner’s 
profit is mixed. The first term of Eq. (5) alone shows a negative effect of seller variety on 
the marketplace owner’s profit. This suggests that, absent value heterogeneity, an 
increase in seller variety leads to greater similarity among sellers, which intensifies 
competition and reduces each seller's profit. The second term of Eq. (5) shows a positive 
effect of variety that is related to sellers’ value heterogeneity. The difference in sellers’ 
value offerings mitigates the competition intensity from the more crowded marketplace 
and allows the sellers to leverage their value offerings in setting prices.  
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Proposition 7 (Optimal Variety) As the variance of sellers’ value offerings increases, the 
optimal seller variety also increases.  
As the value-based support provided by the marketplace owner alters the sellers’ 
competition, the seller variety that leads to the highest profit for the marketplace owner 
becomes greater. The positive effect of variety on the marketplace owner’s profit is more 
pronounced given a higher degree of value heterogeneity (Eq. (5)). An increase in seller 
variety leads to more similarity among sellers horizontally; thus, sellers’ value offerings 
play a more prominent role in the buyers’ and competing sellers’ decisions. It is then 
intuitive to see that, raising sellers’ value heterogeneity allows a greater optimal level of 
variety, as the negative (competition) effect can be offset by the strengthened positive 
heterogeneity effect. 
 This result suggests that the marketplace owner should take into account indirect 
outcome of the Matthew Effect, as it implements the value-based policies. The change in 
sellers’ competition dynamics implies that the marketplace owner can welcome more 
sellers. The increased the seller base will sharpen the benefits that sellers’ value 
heterogeneity creates for the marketplace owners, the higher-value sellers, as well as the 
buyers. Therefore, Matthew Effect helps to create more opportunities for online selling. 
Its benefits extend beyond those on the existing sellers and buyers in the marketplace.   
6. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the competition among a large number of heterogeneous 
sellers and examines the marketplace owner’s value-based policy in managing seller 
heterogeneity. We model the pricing strategies of a variety of sellers with differentiated 
value offerings and find the ripple effect that drives interdependencies of sellers' pricing 
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strategies. Based on the strategic interactions between the sellers and buyers, we study 
the marketplace owner’s value-based support policy. We show that offering the support 
that increases each seller’s value proportionally leads to an increased profit for the 
marketplace owner. The optimal support level depends on the average and variance of the 
sellers’ values – which alter the cost-effectiveness of the support – as well as on the 
buyers' transportation cost. Furthermore, the value-based support also improves consumer 
welfare and leads to higher optimal seller variety. This suggests that Matthew Effect may 
lead to higher social welfare and create new business opportunities for online sellers. 
Several future research directions can be further explored. Information asymmetry 
in a large, competitive marketplace may not be well understood. As online buyers may 
face uncertainty regarding the sellers’ value offerings, introducing uncertainties about 
seller heterogeneity may be a meaningful direction. A follow-up work could introduce 
the marketplace owner's pricing problem for the entry of sellers and buyers to connect 
more closely to the theories of two-sided platform. Our equilibrium characterization 
prepares the foundation for such an analysis.  
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Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From Eq. ((2),   we derive  ݌௜ାଵ ൌ 4݌௜ െ ݌௜ିଵ െ ଶ௧௡ െ ሺ2ݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ାଵ െ ݒ௜ିଵሻ 
Or,  ݌௜ ൌ 4݌௜ିଵ െ ݌௜ିଶ െ ଶ௧௡ െ ሺ2ݒ௜ିଵ െ ݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ିଶሻ. (9)
Eq. ((9) can be written as a set of n FOCs: 
݌௜ െ ൫2 െ √3൯݌௜ିଵ
ൌ ൫2 ൅ √3൯൫݌௜ିଵ െ ൫2 െ √3൯݌௜ିଶ൯ െ 2ݐ݊ െ ሺ2ݒ௜ିଵ െ ݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ିଶሻ (10)
൫2 ൅ √3൯൫݌௜ିଵ െ ൫2 െ √3൯݌௜ିଶ൯
ൌ ൫2 ൅ √3൯ሾ൫2 ൅ √3൯൫݌௜ିଶ െ ൫2 െ √3൯݌௜ିଷ൯ െ 2ݐ݊ െ ሺ2ݒ௜ିଶ
െ ݒ௜ିଵ െ ݒ௜ିଷሻሿ (11)
… 
൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ିଵ൫݌௜ାଵ െ ൫2 െ √3൯݌௜൯
ൌ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ିଵሾ൫2 ൅ √3൯൫݌௜ െ ൫2 െ √3൯݌௜ିଵ൯ െ 2ݐ݊ െ ሺ2ݒ௜ െ ݒ௜ାଵ
െ ݒ௜ିଵሻሿ (12)
Summing up the n FOCs, we have  
ቂ1 െ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ቃ ሺ݌௜ െ ൫2 െ √3	൯݌௜ିଵሻ
ൌ െ2ݐ݊ ෍൫2 ൅ √3	൯
௞
௡ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
െ෍൫2 ൅ √3	൯௞ሺ2
௡ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
ݒ௜ି௞ିଵ െ ݒ௜ି௞ െ ݒ௜ି௞ିଶሻ 
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Or,  
 ݌௜ െ ൫2 െ √3	൯݌௜ିଵ
ൌ 11 ൅ √3 ⋅
2ݐ
݊
െ 1ቂ1 െ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ቃ
෍൫2 ൅ √3	൯௞ሺ2
௡ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
ݒ௜ି௞ିଵ െ ݒ௜ି௞
െ ݒ௜ି௞ିଶሻ 
 
(13)
From here, we derive the following n equations: 
݌௜ ൌ ൫2 െ √3	൯݌௜ିଵ ൅ 11 ൅ √3 ⋅
2ݐ
݊ െ
1
ቂ1 െ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ቃ
෍൫2 ൅ √3 ൯௞ሺ2
௡ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
ݒ௜ି௞ିଵ
െ ݒ௜ି௞ െ ݒ௜ି௞ିଶሻ 
 
(14)
൫2 െ √3	൯݌௜ିଵ ൌ ൫2 െ √3	൯ ቎൫2 െ √3 ൯݌௜ିଶ ൅ 11 ൅ √3 ⋅
2ݐ
݊
െ 1ቂ1 െ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ቃ
෍൫2 ൅ √3	൯௞ሺ2
௡ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
ݒ௜ି௞ିଶ െ ݒ௜ି௞ିଵ െ ݒ௜ି௞ିଷሻ቏ 
 
(15)
… 
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൫2 െ √3	൯௡ିଵ݌௜ାଵ
ൌ ൫2 െ √3	൯௡ିଵ ቎൫2 െ √3	൯݌௜ ൅ 11 ൅ √3 ⋅
2ݐ
݊
െ 1ቂ1 െ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ቃ
෍൫2 ൅ √3	൯௞ሺ2
௡ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
ݒ௜ି௞ െ ݒ௜ି௞ାଵ െ ݒ௜ି௞ିଵሻ቏ 
 
(16)
Sum up these n equations, we have  
ቂ1 െ ൫2 െ √3൯௡ቃ ݌௜ ൌ ଵଵା√ଷ ⋅
ଶ௧
௡ ∑ ൫2 െ √3	൯
௟௡ିଵ௟ୀ଴ െ ∑ ൫2 െ √3	൯௟ ଵቂଵି൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ቃ ∑ ൫2 ൅
௡ିଵ௞ୀ଴௡ିଵ௟ୀ଴
√3	൯௞ሺ2 ݒ௜ି௞ି௟ିଵ െ ݒ௜ି௞ି௟ െ ݒ௜ି௞ି௟ିଶሻ  
Therefore, seller i's equilibrium price is  
 
݌௜ ൌ ݐ݊ െ
1
ቂ1 െ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ቃ ቂ1 െ ൫2 െ √3൯௡ቃ
෍෍൫2 െ √3	൯௟൫2
௡ିଵ
௞ୀ଴
௡ିଵ
௟ୀ଴
൅ √3 ൯௞ሺ2 ݒ௜ି௞ି௟ିଵ െ ݒ௜ି௞ି௟ െ ݒ௜ି௞ି௟ିଶሻ (17)
By re-indexing the v’s, we can write Eq. ((17) as:  
 
݌௜∗ ൌ ݐ݊ െ
1
ቂ1 െ ൫2 ൅ √3൯௡ቃ ቂ1 െ ൫2 െ √3൯௡ቃ
෍ ܾ௠ݒ௜	ି	௠
ଶ௡
௠ୀ଴
 
 
(18)
where  ܾ଴ ൌ െ1; 
 ܾ௠ ൌ െ ଵ√ଷ ቀ൫2 ൅ √3൯
௠ െ ൫2 െ √3൯௠ቁ    for  ݉ ൌ 1,2,… , ݊ െ 1; 
 ܾ௡ ൌ √ଷିଵ√ଷ ൫2 ൅ √3൯
௡ ൅ √ଷାଵ√ଷ ൫2 െ √3൯
௡
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 ܾ௠ ൌ െ ଵ√ଷ ቀ൫2 ൅ √3൯
ଶ௡ି௠ െ ൫2 െ √3൯ଶ௡ି௠ቁ    for  ݉ ൌ ݊ ൅ 1, ݊ ൅ 2,… ,2݊ െ 1; 
 ܾଶ௡ ൌ െ1 
Note that ݒ௜, ݒ௜ି௡, ݒ௜ିଶ௡ refer to the same seller, and that for ݉ ൌ 1,2,… , ݊ െ 1,  ݒ௜ି௠ 
and ݒ௜ି௠ି௡ refer to the same seller.  Therefore, combine the parameters of the same ݒ௜, 
for ݅ ൌ 0,1, … ݊ െ 1, we have  
 
݌௜∗ ൌ ݐ݊ ൅ ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
 
(19)
where,  ܾ ௗ ൌ ൫ଶା√ଷ൯
೙ష೏ା൫ଶା√ଷ൯೏
√ଷሺ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵሻ	 ൐ 0. From Eq. ((2), we derive the equilibrium demand 
ݍ௜ ൌ ௣೔௧ ൌ
ଵ
௡ ൅
௩೔
௧ െ
ଵ
௧ ∑ ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ . Thus, Seller i's equilibrium profit is ߨ௜∗ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߛሻ݌௜∗ݍ௜∗ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ௣೔
∗మ
௧ . □ 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The result follows immediately from ݌ ൌ ௧௡. □ 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The marketplace owner’s expected profit is the expectation of the aggregate of sellers’ 
profits multiplied by the fraction ߛ: 
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ܧሺΠ∗ሻ ൌ ߛݐ ܧ ൤෍ ݌௜
∗ଶ௡ିଵ
௜ୀ଴
൨ ൌ ݊ߛݐ ܧ ቎൭
ݐ
݊ ൅ ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൱
ଶ
቏
ൌ ݊ߛݐ ܧ ቎
ݐଶ
݊ଶ ൅
2ݐ
݊ ൭ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൱ ൅ ൭ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൱
ଶ
቏
ൌ ߛݐ݊ ൅
݊ߛ
ݐ ܧ ቎
2ݐ
݊ ൭ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൱ ൅ ൭ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൱
ଶ
቏. 
It can be shown that ∑ ܾௗ ൌ 1௡ିଵௗୀ଴ , based on which we further simplify: 
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ܧ ቎2ݐ݊ ൭ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൱ ൅ ൭ݒ௜ െ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൱
ଶ
቏
ൌ 2ݐ݊ ܧሺݒሻ ൬1 െ෍ ܾௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀ଴
൰
൅ ܧ ቌݒ௜ଶሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶ െ 2ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻݒ௜ ෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
൅ ൭෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
൱
ଶ
ቍ
ൌ ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶܧሺݒଶሻ െ 2ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻ෍ܾௗܧଶሺݒሻ ൅ ܧ ൭෍ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
൱
ଶ௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
ൌ ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶܧሺݒଶሻ െ 2ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻܧଶሺݒሻ
൅෍ܾௗଶܧሺݒଶሻ ൅෍ ௝ܾܾ௞ܧଶሺݒሻ
௡ିଵ
௝,௞ୀଵ;௝ஷ௞
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
ൌ ൬ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶ ൅෍ ܾௗଶ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
൰ ሾܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൅ ܧଶሺݒሻሿ െ 2ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻܧଶሺݒሻ
൅෍ ௝ܾܾ௞ܧଶሺݒሻ
௡ିଵ
௝,௞ୀଵ;௝ஷ௞
ൌ ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶ ൅෍ ܾௗଶ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
൨
൅ ܧଶሺݒሻ ቈሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶ െ 2ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶ ൅ ൬෍ ܾௗଶ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
൰
ଶ
቉
ൌ ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൤ሺ1 െ ܾ଴ሻଶ ൅෍ ܾௗଶ
௡ିଵ
ௗୀଵ
൨
ൌ 	ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൬1 െ 43√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰. 
Therefore, ܧሺΠ∗ሻ ൌ ఊ௧௡ ൅
ఊ௡
௧ ∙ ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ቀ1 െ
ସ
ଷ√ଷ
ఋ೙ାଵ
ఋ೙ିଵ ൅
ଶ௡
ଷ
ఋ೙
ሺఋ೙ିଵሻమቁ. □ 
Proof of Proposition 3 
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The platform is interested in solving ߙ to maximize the gains from offering quality 
support minus the costs incurred: 
ߛ݊
ݐ ܸܽݎሺݒሻሺߙ
ଶ ൅ 2ߙሻ ൬1 െ 43√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰ െ ݊ܿߙ
ଶ൫ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൅ ܧଶሺݒሻ൯. 
The FOC with respect to ߙ is: 
2݊ߙ ൤ߛݐ ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൬1 െ
4
3√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰ െ ܿ൫ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൅ ܧ
ଶሺݒሻ൯൨
൅ 2ߛ݊ݐ ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൬1 െ
4
3√3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ߜ௡ െ 1 ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ൰ ൌ 0. 
Suppose the second-order condition is satisfied, such that ܿ ൐
ം
೟௏௔௥ሺ௩ሻ൬ଵି
ర
య√య
ഃ೙శభ
ഃ೙షభା
మ೙
య
ഃ೙
ሺഃ೙షభሻమ൰
௏௔௥ሺ௩ሻାாమሺ௩ሻ , 
we have an internal solution ߙ∗ ൐ 0. □  
Proof of Proposition 4 
It is straightforward to show that Eq. (8) decreases in ܧሺݒሻ and increases in ܸܽݎሺݒሻ. □ 
Proof of Proposition 5 
It is straightforward to show that Eq. (8) decreases in ݐ. □ 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Define the buyer who is indifferent between the sellers located at 0 and ଵ௡ as ݔ∗ ൌ
ଵ
ଶ௧ ሺ݌ଵ െ ݌଴ െ ݒଵ ൅ ݒ଴ሻ ൅
ଵ
ଶ௡, such that for a buyer located at ݔ between 0 and 
ଵ
௡, if 0 ൑
ݔ ൏ ݔ∗,  the buyer buys from the seller located at 0; if ݔ∗ ൑ ݔ ൑ ଵ௡, she buys from the 
seller at ଵ௡. The expected utility for the buyers located between 0 and 1 is: 
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ݑ|ቂ଴,భ೙ቃ ൌ ׬ ሺݒ଴ െ ݌଴ െ ݐݔሻ݀ݔ
௫∗
଴ ൅ ׬ ൬ݒଵ െ ݌ଵ െ ݐ ቀଵ௡ െ ݔቁ൰ ݀ݔ
భ
೙௫∗ 	  
ൌ ሺݒ଴ െ ݌଴ሻݔ∗ െ ௧ଶ ݔ∗ଶ ൅ ቀ
ଵ
௡ െ ݔ∗ቁ ቀݒଵ െ ݌ଵ െ
௧
௡ቁ ൅
௧
ଶ ሺ
ଵ
௡మ െ ݔ∗ଶሻ  
ൌ െݐݔ∗ଶ ൅ ݔ∗ ቀݒ଴ െ ݌଴ െ ݒଵ ൅ ݌ଵ ൅ ௧௡ቁ ൅
ଵ
௡ ሺݒଵ െ ݌ଵሻ െ
௧
ଶ௡మ  
ൌ െݐ ቀ ଵଶ௧ ሺ݌ଵ െ ݌଴ െ ݒଵ ൅ ݒ଴ሻ ൅
ଵ
ଶ௡ቁ
ଶ ൅ ሺ ଵଶ௧ ሺ݌ଵ െ ݌଴ െ ݒଵ ൅ ݒ଴ሻ ൅
ଵ
ଶ௡ሻ ቀݒ଴ െ ݌଴ െ ݒଵ ൅
݌ଵ ൅ ௧௡ቁ ൅
ଵ
௡ ሺݒଵ െ ݌ଵሻ െ
௧
ଶ௡మ  
Define ܽ ≡ ݌ଵ െ ݌଴ െ ݒଵ ൅ ݒ଴, then,  ݑ|ቂ଴,భ೙ቃ ൌ െݐ ቀ
ଵ
ଶ௧ ܽ ൅
ଵ
ଶ௡ቁ
ଶ ൅ ቀ ଵଶ௧ ܽ ൅
ଵ
ଶ௡ቁ ቀܽ ൅
௧
௡ቁ ൅
ଵ
௡ ሺݒଵ െ ݌ଵሻ െ
௧
ଶ௡మ. 
Based on the distribution of the sellers’ values, we can derive the following: 
ܧሺ݌௜ଶሻ ൌ 	ܧ ൥ቆ௧௡ ൅
∑ ௕೏௩೔ష೏೙షభ೏సబ
ቀ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵቁቀଵି൫ଶି√ଷ൯೙ቁቇ
ଶ
൩ ൌ ௧మ௡మ ൅
ாቂ൫∑ ௕೏௩೔ష೏	೙షభ೏సబ ൯
మቃ
ቀ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵቁቀଵି൫ଶି√ଷ൯೙ቁ   
∵ 	 ሺ∑ ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ ሻଶ ൌ ሺ∑ ܾௗݒ௜	ି	ௗ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ െ ܧሺݒሻ∑ ܾௗ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ ሻଶ ൌ ሺ∑ ܾௗሺݒ௜	ି	ௗ െ ܧሺݒሻሻ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ ሻଶ  
ൌ ∑ ܾௗଶ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ ሺݒ௜ିௗ െ ܧሺݒሻሻଶ ൅ 2∑ ௝ܾܾ௞ ቀݒ௜ି௝ െ ܧሺݒሻቁ ൫ݒ௜ି௞ െ ܧሺݒሻ൯௝ஷ௞   
∴	 ܧሾሺ∑ ܾௗݒ௜ିௗ	௡ିଵௗୀ଴ ሻଶሿ ൌ ܧ ቂ∑ ܾௗଶ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ ൫ݒ௜ିௗ െ ܧሺݒሻ൯ଶ ൅ 2∑ ௝ܾܾ௞ ቀݒ௜ି௝ െ௝ஷ௞
ܧሺݒሻቁ ൫ݒ௜ି௞ െ ܧሺݒሻ൯ቃ 
ൌ ∑ ܾௗଶܧ ቂ൫ݒ௜ିௗ െ ܧሺݒሻ൯ଶቃ௡ିଵௗୀ଴ ൌ ܸܽݎሺݒሻ∑ ܾௗଶ௡ିଵௗୀ଴   
Therefore, ܧሺ݌௜ଶሻ ൌ ௧
మ
௡మ ൅
∑ ௕೏మ೙షభ೏సబ
ቀ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵቁమቀଵି൫ଶି√ଷ൯೙ቁమ
ܸܽݎሺݒሻ, 
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ܧሺ݌௜݌௜ାଵሻ ൌ ௧
మ
௡మ ൅
∑ ௕೏௕೏శభ೙షభ೏సబ
ቀ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵቁమቀଵି൫ଶି√ଷ൯೙ቁమ
ܸܽݎሺݒሻ, 
ܧሺܽሻ ൌ 0, and  
ܧሺܽଶሻ ൌ ܧሾሺ݌ଵ െ ݌଴ െ ݒଵ ൅ ݒ଴ሻଶሿ ൌ ܧሾሺ݌ଵ െ ݌଴ሻଶሿ ൅ ܧሾሺݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻଶሿ ൌ 2ܧሺ݌௜ଶሻ െ
2ܧሺ݌௜݌௜ାଵሻ ൅ 2ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൌ 2ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ቆ1 ൅ ∑ ௕೏ሺ௕೏ି௕೏శభሻ
೙షభ೏సబ
ቀ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵቁమቀଵି൫ଶି√ଷ൯೙ቁమ
ቇ.   
The total consumer surplus is:   
ܧሺݑ|௫ሻ ൌ ݊ ⋅ ܧ ൤ݑ|ቂ଴,భ೙ቃ൨ ൌ ݊ ⋅ ܧ ൤െݐ ቀ
ଵ
ଶ௧ ܽ ൅
ଵ
ଶ௡ቁ
ଶ ൅ ቀ ଵଶ௧ ܽ ൅
ଵ
ଶ௡ቁ ቀܽ ൅
௧
௡ቁ ൅
ଵ
௡ ሺݒଵ െ ݌ଵሻ െ
௧
ଶ௡మ൨  
ൌ ݊ ቂ ଵସ௧ ܧሺܽଶሻ െ
ହ
ସ
௧
௡మ ൅
ଵ
௡ ܧሺݒሻቃ ൌ
௡
ଶ௧ 	ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ቆ1 ൅
∑ ௕೏ሺ௕೏ି௕೏శభሻ೙షభ೏సబ
ቀ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵቁమቀଵି൫ଶି√ଷ൯೙ቁమ
ቇ െ ହସ
௧
௡ ൅
ܧሺݒሻ  
Notice that 1 ൅ ∑ ௕೏ሺ௕೏ି௕೏శభሻ೙షభ೏సబ
ቀ൫ଶା√ଷ൯೙ିଵቁమቀଵି൫ଶି√ଷ൯೙ቁమ
൐ 0,  therefore, the total consumer surplus 
increases in the variance of the sellers’ values. □  
Proof of Proposition 7 
From Lemma 1, the optimal variety ݊∗ must satisfy the following two conditions: 
F.O.C. w.r.t. ݊   
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ܪሺ݊ሻ ≡ ߲ܧ ቀΠ
∗ቁ
߲݊
ൌ െ ߛݐ݊ଶ
൅ ߛܸܽݎሺݒሻݐ ൤1 െ
4
3√3 ൬1 ൅
2
ߜ௡ െ 1൰ ൅
2݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ
൅ ݊ ൬ 43√3
2ߜ௡݈݊ߜ
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ ൅
2
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ െ
2݊
3
ߜ௡ ൅ 1
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଷ ߜ
௡݈݊ߜ൰൨
ൌ െ ߛݐ݊ଶ
൅ ߛܸܽݎሺݒሻݐ ൤1 െ
4
3√3 ൬1 ൅
2
ߜ௡ െ 1൰
൅ 4݊3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ ൬1 ൅
2݈݊ߜ
√3 െ
݈݊݊ߜ
2 െ
݈݊݊ߜ
ߜ௡ െ 1൰൨ ൌ 0. 
S.O.C. w.r.t. ݊             డమாሺஈ∗ሻడ௡మ ൌ
డு
డ௡ ൏ 0  
߲ܪ
߲ܸܽݎሺݒሻ ൌ 1 െ
4
3√3 ൬1 ൅
2
ߜ௡ െ 1൰ ൅
4݊
3
ߜ௡
ሺߜ௡ െ 1ሻଶ ൬1 ൅
2݈݊ߜ
√3 െ
݈݊݊ߜ
2 െ
݈݊݊ߜ
ߜ௡ െ 1൰. 
It can easily be shown that డுడ௏௔௥ሺ௩ሻ ൐ 0 when ݊ ∈ ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ; Furthermore, 
డு
డ௏௔௥ሺ௩ሻ is 
monotonically increasing when ݊ ൐ 4.  Therefore, డுడ௏௔௥ሺ௩ሻ ൐ 0.  
Hence, డ௡
∗
డ௏௔௥ሺ௩ሻ ൌ െ
ങಹ
ങೇೌೝሺೡሻ
ങಹ
ങ೙
. In other words, the variance of sellers' value offerings 
increases the optimal seller variety. □ 
 
